The Battle of Midway
The Battle of Midway, fought over and near the tiny U.S. mid-Pacific base at Midway atoll, represents a significant strategic victory for the Allies Pacific Ocean war and is considered the turning point in the Pacific when the Allies begin to make significant progress towards reaching their goal of coming within striking distance of mainland Japan.
Prior to this action, Japan possessed general naval superiority over the United States and could usually choose where and when to attack. After Midway, the two opposing fleets were essentially equals, and the United States soon took the offensive.
Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto moved on Midway in an effort to draw out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier striking forces, which had embarrassed the Japanese Navy in the mid-April Doolittle Raid on Japan's home islands and at the Battle of Coral Sea in early May. He planned to quickly knock down Midway's defenses, follow up with an invasion of the atoll's two small islands and establish a Japanese air base there. He expected the U.S. carriers to come out and fight, but to arrive too late to save Midway and in insufficient strength to avoid defeat by his own well-tested carrier air power.
Yamamoto's intended surprise was thwarted by superior American communications intelligence, which deduced his scheme well before battle was joined. This allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, to establish an ambush by having his carriers ready and waiting for the Japanese.
On 4 June 1942, in the second of the Pacific War's great carrier battles, the trap was sprung. The perseverance, sacrifice and skill of U.S. Navy aviators, plus a great deal of good luck on the American side, cost Japan four irreplaceable fleet carriers, while only one of the three U.S. carriers present was lost the USS Yorktown (CV-10). The base at Midway, though damaged by Japanese air attack, remained operational and later became a vital component in the American trans-Pacific offensive.
Prior to this action, Japan possessed general naval superiority over the United States and could usually choose where and when to attack. After Midway, the two opposing fleets were essentially equals, and the United States soon took the offensive.
Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto moved on Midway in an effort to draw out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier striking forces, which had embarrassed the Japanese Navy in the mid-April Doolittle Raid on Japan's home islands and at the Battle of Coral Sea in early May. He planned to quickly knock down Midway's defenses, follow up with an invasion of the atoll's two small islands and establish a Japanese air base there. He expected the U.S. carriers to come out and fight, but to arrive too late to save Midway and in insufficient strength to avoid defeat by his own well-tested carrier air power.
Yamamoto's intended surprise was thwarted by superior American communications intelligence, which deduced his scheme well before battle was joined. This allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, to establish an ambush by having his carriers ready and waiting for the Japanese.
On 4 June 1942, in the second of the Pacific War's great carrier battles, the trap was sprung. The perseverance, sacrifice and skill of U.S. Navy aviators, plus a great deal of good luck on the American side, cost Japan four irreplaceable fleet carriers, while only one of the three U.S. carriers present was lost the USS Yorktown (CV-10). The base at Midway, though damaged by Japanese air attack, remained operational and later became a vital component in the American trans-Pacific offensive.
The Battle of Midway effectively destroyed Japan’s naval strength when the Americans destroyed four of its aircraft carriers. Japan’s navy never recovered from its defeat at Midway and it was on the defensive after this battle.
The Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz, had received intelligence that the Japanese, after what could be deemed the failure at Coral Sea, was out for a decisive battle against the American Navy. Nimitz knew that they wanted to capture Midway Island, on the western extremity of the Hawaiian islands, to further extend their control of the Pacific.
Yamamoto's plan was ingenious but too intricate. It also contained two defects:
1. Yamamoto believed in the supremacy of the
battleship. He failed to realize that an aircraft
carrier could deliver a massive blow to the
enemy but at a much greater distance than a
battleship could. Yamamoto saw the aircraft
carrier as supporting the battleship rather
than the other way round. His huge
battleships were also slower than any other
warship he had and the rest of his fleet had to
sail at a pace that suited the battleships.
2. Far more fatal to Yamamoto was the fact that
the Americans knew his course of action.
Admirals Spruance and Fletcher had their
ships waiting for an attack and Yamamoto's
plan to lure American ships away from their
main body clearly would not work if the
Americans knew that this was his intent.
The consequences of the Battle of Midway for the Japanese were huge. With one stroke they had lost four vital aircraft carriers that were considered to be vital for the Pacific campaign. Whereas the Americans could replace the 'Yorktown', the Japanese would have found it very difficult to replace one carrier, let alone four. Regardless of finding new carriers, experienced crew would also be needed and the Japanese had lost many experienced crewmen during the battle.
The Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz, had received intelligence that the Japanese, after what could be deemed the failure at Coral Sea, was out for a decisive battle against the American Navy. Nimitz knew that they wanted to capture Midway Island, on the western extremity of the Hawaiian islands, to further extend their control of the Pacific.
Yamamoto's plan was ingenious but too intricate. It also contained two defects:
1. Yamamoto believed in the supremacy of the
battleship. He failed to realize that an aircraft
carrier could deliver a massive blow to the
enemy but at a much greater distance than a
battleship could. Yamamoto saw the aircraft
carrier as supporting the battleship rather
than the other way round. His huge
battleships were also slower than any other
warship he had and the rest of his fleet had to
sail at a pace that suited the battleships.
2. Far more fatal to Yamamoto was the fact that
the Americans knew his course of action.
Admirals Spruance and Fletcher had their
ships waiting for an attack and Yamamoto's
plan to lure American ships away from their
main body clearly would not work if the
Americans knew that this was his intent.
The consequences of the Battle of Midway for the Japanese were huge. With one stroke they had lost four vital aircraft carriers that were considered to be vital for the Pacific campaign. Whereas the Americans could replace the 'Yorktown', the Japanese would have found it very difficult to replace one carrier, let alone four. Regardless of finding new carriers, experienced crew would also be needed and the Japanese had lost many experienced crewmen during the battle.