1938 - 1941 United States Bans resources to Japan
The major conflict in Asia involved Japan’s determination to conquer China in pursuit of an empire of its own to match those of the European powers. The United States was determined for a variety of reasons that Japan should not dominate China. This was the issue that eventually brought the U.S. and Japan to war.
Japan first invaded Manchuria, a Chinese province, in 1931, and by July of 1937 Japan had overrun northern China, despite protests by the U.S. and the League of Nations (from which Japan, like Germany, simply withdrew). FDR was uncertain how best to deal with Japan. On the one hand, the U.S. was supplying arms to China, but on the other hand the U.S. continued to sell large quantities of scrap metal, steel, copper, oil, lead, and machinery to Japan. FDR could have stopped the sales, but feared that this would simply encourage Japan to conquer more territory to replace lost resources.
Throughout this period there was wide-spread bombing of Chinese civilians by the Japanese. This practice aroused great indignation in the United States. It also adversely affected American nationals in China. The Secretary of State on June 11, 1938 condemned the practice and its "material encouragement".
On July 1, 1938 the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations.
In 1939 this "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to plans, plants, and technical information for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline. These measures resulted in the suspension of the export to Japan of aircraft, aeronautical equipment, and other materials within the scope of the moral embargoes.
United States Protest December 31, 1931
As the conflict between Japan and China developed, interferences with the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals, by Japanese or Japanese-sponsored agents in China became more and more frequent. The Government of the United States on many occasions protested to the Japanese Government against these interferences.
The major conflict in Asia involved Japan’s determination to conquer China in pursuit of an empire of its own to match those of the European powers. The United States was determined for a variety of reasons that Japan should not dominate China. This was the issue that eventually brought the U.S. and Japan to war.
Japan first invaded Manchuria, a Chinese province, in 1931, and by July of 1937 Japan had overrun northern China, despite protests by the U.S. and the League of Nations (from which Japan, like Germany, simply withdrew). FDR was uncertain how best to deal with Japan. On the one hand, the U.S. was supplying arms to China, but on the other hand the U.S. continued to sell large quantities of scrap metal, steel, copper, oil, lead, and machinery to Japan. FDR could have stopped the sales, but feared that this would simply encourage Japan to conquer more territory to replace lost resources.
Throughout this period there was wide-spread bombing of Chinese civilians by the Japanese. This practice aroused great indignation in the United States. It also adversely affected American nationals in China. The Secretary of State on June 11, 1938 condemned the practice and its "material encouragement".
On July 1, 1938 the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations.
In 1939 this "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to plans, plants, and technical information for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline. These measures resulted in the suspension of the export to Japan of aircraft, aeronautical equipment, and other materials within the scope of the moral embargoes.
United States Protest December 31, 1931
As the conflict between Japan and China developed, interferences with the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals, by Japanese or Japanese-sponsored agents in China became more and more frequent. The Government of the United States on many occasions protested to the Japanese Government against these interferences.
Notice of Termination of Commercial Treaty with Japan
As evidence accumulated of the endangering of American lives, the destruction of American property, and the violation of American rights and interests by Japanese authorities or Japanese-sponsored agents in China, and after diplomatic representations had failed to effect a substantial alleviation of the situation, further consideration was given to the possibility of commercial retaliation against Japan. It was felt that the 1911 commercial treaty between the United States and Japan was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. Consequently, in July 1939 this Government gave notice of termination of that treaty at the end of the six-month period prescribed by the treaty. That termination removed the legal obstacle to an embargo by the United States upon the shipment of materials to Japan.
The "moral embargoes" of 1938 and 1939, referred to previously, brought about the cessation of the export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautic equipment, and certain other materials.
The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 authorized the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools, beginning in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, the Japanese protested to our government on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act". The United States Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that it was really "amazing" for the Japanese Government, which had been violating in the most aggravating manner American rights and interests throughout most of China, to question the fullest right of this Government to impose such an embargo. To go further and call it an "unfriendly act", the Secretary said, was still more amazing in the light of Japan's conduct in disregarding all law, treaty obligations, and other rights and privileges and the safety of Americans, while proceeding to an ever-increasing extent to seize territory by force. Secretary of State Hull agreed that such an occurrence would be exceedingly unfortunate but added that his Government had been extremely patient. The Secretary went on to say that we stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice, along with genuine friendliness between the two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those dominating the external policy of Japan were, "as we here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit".
Secretary Hull reiterated that it was unheard-of for a country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third nation and seriously insist that the latter would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it did not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion. The Secretary made clear to the Ambassador his Government's view that Germany and Japan were undertaking to subjugate both of their respective areas of the world.
Despite the Japanese protest, a total embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap to destinations other than countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain went into effect on October 16, 1940.
The effect of United States policy in regard to exports to Japan was that by the winter of 1940-41 shipment had ceased of many strategic commodities including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron, iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to war effort.
This is important because in order for Japan to continue on it’s path of conquest they needed access to these natural resources (this was the primary reason for them invading parts of China to seize and make use of that countries resources). Japan is a relatively small country with limited resources and she had two options take the resources by force or to buy the resources. The United States took the second option away from Japan by implementing this embargo.
As evidence accumulated of the endangering of American lives, the destruction of American property, and the violation of American rights and interests by Japanese authorities or Japanese-sponsored agents in China, and after diplomatic representations had failed to effect a substantial alleviation of the situation, further consideration was given to the possibility of commercial retaliation against Japan. It was felt that the 1911 commercial treaty between the United States and Japan was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. Consequently, in July 1939 this Government gave notice of termination of that treaty at the end of the six-month period prescribed by the treaty. That termination removed the legal obstacle to an embargo by the United States upon the shipment of materials to Japan.
The "moral embargoes" of 1938 and 1939, referred to previously, brought about the cessation of the export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautic equipment, and certain other materials.
The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 authorized the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools, beginning in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, the Japanese protested to our government on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act". The United States Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that it was really "amazing" for the Japanese Government, which had been violating in the most aggravating manner American rights and interests throughout most of China, to question the fullest right of this Government to impose such an embargo. To go further and call it an "unfriendly act", the Secretary said, was still more amazing in the light of Japan's conduct in disregarding all law, treaty obligations, and other rights and privileges and the safety of Americans, while proceeding to an ever-increasing extent to seize territory by force. Secretary of State Hull agreed that such an occurrence would be exceedingly unfortunate but added that his Government had been extremely patient. The Secretary went on to say that we stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice, along with genuine friendliness between the two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those dominating the external policy of Japan were, "as we here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit".
Secretary Hull reiterated that it was unheard-of for a country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third nation and seriously insist that the latter would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it did not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion. The Secretary made clear to the Ambassador his Government's view that Germany and Japan were undertaking to subjugate both of their respective areas of the world.
Despite the Japanese protest, a total embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap to destinations other than countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain went into effect on October 16, 1940.
The effect of United States policy in regard to exports to Japan was that by the winter of 1940-41 shipment had ceased of many strategic commodities including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron, iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to war effort.
This is important because in order for Japan to continue on it’s path of conquest they needed access to these natural resources (this was the primary reason for them invading parts of China to seize and make use of that countries resources). Japan is a relatively small country with limited resources and she had two options take the resources by force or to buy the resources. The United States took the second option away from Japan by implementing this embargo.